Ma`rifat Hoghoughi

Abstract: The relationship between human rights and democracy constitutes one of the most fundamental and contested debates in contemporary public law and political theory. The dominant post–World War II discourse has largely portrayed these two concepts as mutually reinforcing and inherently compatible. However, empirical developments within modern constitutional democracies and transformations in international politics reveal that this presumed harmony is frequently disrupted by deep structural tensions. Drawing on Martin Loughlin’s philosophy of public law, this article offers a critical re-examination of the relationship between human rights and democracy, arguing that, from Loughlin’s perspective, these two logics are not harmoniously aligned but are instead engaged in a persistent and constitutive dialectical tension. Employing a descriptive–analytical method and a critical analysis of Loughlin’s key works and relevant theoretical literature, the study demonstrates that the dominance of judicialized human rights over democratic decision-making weakens popular sovereignty, generates a crisis of political representation, and contributes to the expansion of judicial supremacy. At the international level, this imbalance facilitates the instrumentalization of human rights as a legitimizing framework for external pressure, sanctions, and intervention. Conversely, subordinating human rights to unchecked democratic will risks legitimizing the tyranny of the majority. The article therefore contends that Loughlin’s proposed solution lies not in prioritizing one logic over the other, but in the dynamic and conscious management of their tension. Preserving democratic mechanisms for constitutional revision, strengthening institutional accountability, and re-politicizing public law are essential for maintaining this balance. Ultimately, the article concludes that a dialectical understanding of human rights and democracy provides a more realistic and strategically valuable framework for sustaining democratic legitimacy in both domestic and international political orders.