اندیشه‌های حقوق عمومی

The relationship between human rights and democracy is one of the most fundamental and controversial topics in contemporary public law and political theory. The dominant discourse after World War II has presented the two as complementary to one another; however, practical experience demonstrates that this theoretical coexistence is accompanied by deep structural tensions. The present research, relying on Martin Loughlin's philosophy of public law, undertakes a critical re-reading of this relationship. From Loughlin's perspective, human rights and democracy are situated not in a harmonious relationship but in a dialectical and inherently tense connection. The findings indicate that the dominance of the juridified logic of human rights over democratic logic weakens the general will, creates a crisis of representation, expands judicial supremacy, and depoliticizes collective decision-making processes. In the international arena, this dominance has also become a tool for legitimizing intervention, pressure, and sanctions. Conversely, disregarding human rights in the name of democratic sovereignty paves the way for the tyranny of the majority. Loughlin's solution is not the elimination of either logic, but rather the dynamic and conscious management of the tension between them. Achieving this balance requires preserving the possibility of democratic constitutional amendment, strengthening institutional accountability, and rebuilding the connection between public law and political will.